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32  What is the value of life?
T he UK Department for Transport (DfT) values the prevention of a fatality on Britain’s roads at £1.8 million (2016 £s). This value is used across government departments and agencies, including 
the Office for Nuclear Regulation, as a de facto standard for valuing the 
benefit of safety measures that preserve human life; however, there is no 
evidential basis for this valuation as it is derived from a statistical analysis of 
sparse survey data carried out 20 years ago that has now been found to 
be flawed. The methodology used to infer the VPF has been shown to be 
internally inconsistent, with the final recommended value being subjective. 
Members of the public whose opinions were rejected by the survey team 
actually gave entirely rational and understandable valuations based on 
human perceptions of utility. Another influential study – used to justify a 
significant reduction in spending to prevent multi-fatality rail accidents – 
has been found to be systematically biased against those very people who 
wanted more to be spent on preventing accidents causing multiple deaths. 
In contrast to the one-size-fits-all VPF, the J-value provides an objective, 
rational and statistically rigorous methodology that values the prevention of 
a premature death in terms of the amount of life that the potential victim 
would lose.
1. Philosophical problems
At the heart of UK health and safety policy is the demand that the 
risks involved in any venture should be reduced ‘so far as is reasonably 
practicable’, as specified by the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
This broad requirement, interpreted as bringing residual risks ‘as low as 
reasonably practicable’ (ALARP), has been expounded in many sets of 
regulations and guidelines, notably the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) 
document ‘Reducing risks, protecting people’ [1]. That document follows 
case law, in recommending that the ALARP requirement can be fulfilled 
only if the costs of reducing the risks any further can be demonstrated to 
be grossly disproportionate to any benefits received. Finding the balance 
between the benefit of preventing injury or death against the cost of doing 
so implies that a common metric should be used for both sides in the 
comparison, and this is conveniently taken as money. This entails ascribing a 
monetary value to healthy life. 
The economic worth of a good can best be established from its market 
value – the price on which buyer and seller agree; however, health and 
safety benefits are, by and large, not free-market goods and so alternative 
evaluation methods need to be used. The next best method is to look at 
people’s ‘revealed preferences’. As the seventeenth-century philosopher 
John Locke said: “I have always thought the actions of men the best 
interpreters of their thoughts” [2]. Such methods are widely used in North 
America; for example, the US Department of Transportation uses labour 
market statistics to derive a ‘value of a statistical life’ of $9.1 million (2012 
dollars) [3]. The method assumes that jobs involving a risk to life demand 
a wage premium, and this reveals the value the employee places on his 
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life. For a critique of these revealed preference methods see the review by 
Viscusi and Aldy [4].
When neither market values nor revealed preferences are available, an 
opinion survey of monetary preferences constitutes the final approach to 
estimating the financial value of averting a premature death. Such a ‘stated 
preference’ line of attack is sometimes called ‘contingent valuation’, since 
the estimates obtained are conditional or ‘contingent’ on the features of 
the scenario presented to the respondents taking part in the survey [5]. A 
variant of this technique is relied upon by the DfT for its published ‘value 
of a prevented (statistical) fatality’, generally abbreviated to VPF. The DfT 
VPF is held to be proportional to gross domestic product (GDP) per head 
and has a current value of £1.83 million (2016 £s) [6]. It is used across 
multiple government sectors and industries, including the Office for Nuclear 
Regulation (ONR).
Stated preference methods have inherent limitations, beyond any 
difficulties in particular methodologies [7]. For example a lack of 
information can lead to a reluctance to pay for something that would 
produce significant benefits or, conversely, people can be willing to pay for 
something with no discernible benefit. Moreover, people may be influenced 
by the perceived behaviour of others, and, for example, be willing to pay 
more if they believe that everyone is making an equal contribution rather 
than if their sacrifice is made on an individual basis. Beyond that, the 
maximum amount that a person will be prepared to pay will obviously 
depend on his or her ability to pay, which means that any survey must cover 
the full spectrum of wealths in the target population. (Later in this article, 
the procedure on which the UK VPF is based will be shown to experience 
particular problems over this requirement, see Section 3.)
But there is a further difficulty with the very principle of assigning a single 
value to ‘preventing a fatality’. The wording itself embodies a confusion, 
since there is no way to ‘prevent a fatality’, as everyone is going to die at 
some point. In fact, the best that a safety measure can achieve is to restore 
the future years of life that would otherwise have been lost. It is self-evident 
that preventing the premature death of a young person is likely to have 
a greater value – in terms of the length of his or her future life – than 
preventing the premature death of an old person. To quote the Oxford 
philosopher John Broome: “Some people suggest that life has an infinite 
value but it does not: it has a finite value and it is a matter of quantity” [8]. 
This perspective leads to the notion of valuing the number of life-years lost 
to measure the impact of an injury or illness leading to premature death, 
rather than assigning a uniform value to every prevented fatality.
Some might argue that valuing loss of life expectancy discriminates in 
favour of the young and against the old. But it does not, as the next hour 
of life is valued equally for all, or, as Sunstein put it: “Everyone’s life year 
counts as no less and no more than one” [7]. This approach to valuing 
life-years provides the basis recommended by NICE [9] for measuring the 
impact of illness and non-fatal injuries. The ‘quality-adjusted life year’ (QALY) 
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advocated by NICE assigns a monetary value to a year of life, reduced 
from its normal value in proportion to the severity of the ongoing illness or 
chronic injury. 
The one-size-fits-all VPF has a limitation of particular significance to the 
nuclear industry, in that it fails completely to account for deaths that are 
delayed by many years. For example, the VPF approach would characterise 
death after, perhaps, two years of illness at the age of 70, resulting from 
an accident that happened 30 years earlier, in exactly the same way as an 
accident that cut off that same person’s life immediately, at the age of 40. 
This is clearly a nonsense, as in the first case about a decade of life can 
be expected to be lost, while about 40 years can be expected to be lost 
in the second. The misconception is relevant to nuclear power because 
most radiation doses, whether as a result of an accident or coming from 
a continuing exposure, are low level, and any health effects, should they 
occur, will be delayed by tens of years on average. A similar effect applies to 
exposure to toxic materials in other industries, as evidenced by the delayed 
mortality from asbestosis among asbestos workers, and from ‘black lung’ 
(pneumoconiosis) among coal miners [10].
The UK VPF is based on a series of small-scale opinion surveys carried 
out 20 years ago by essentially the same team. That team dismissed its first 
attempt [11] in favour of its second [12]. It is a matter of some concern that, 
despite its significant philosophic shortcomings, the VPF is widely used by 
UK government departments and agencies, including the ONR, as discussed 
in Section 2. It is rather more troubling that the study [12] on which the 
current VPF rests has been shown to possess serious inconsistencies [13]. 
The debate in the literature over the validity of the VPF will be reviewed 
in detail in Section 3, which will highlight the logical inconsistencies in 
the reasoning that led to the accepted figure of £1 million (1997 £s). As 
will be shown in Section 4, a realistic model of people’s attitude to risk 
demonstrated that a VPF of between £9 million and £12 million (1997 £s) 
seems actually to have been preferred by survey respondents. Furthermore, 
it will be shown in Section 5 that the government’s decision to remove the 
premium on spending to prevent multiple-fatality rail accidents has not 
been justified, since the apparent ‘justification’ relies on analysing opinions 
using a method now mathematically discredited. 
Section 6 will deal briefly with the J-value method, which conforms to 
the precepts of Locke, Sunstein and Broome, and offers a way of valuing life 
that is objective, rational and statistically rigorous. 
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions of this review, including 
comments on the possible legal position.
2. The UK’s VPF and its use 
The closing years of the 1990s saw the Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions commission the research that underpins the 
value of a prevented fatality currently used in the UK. An independent 
review of the VPF was conducted for the government by the accountants 
Deloitte LLP in 2009 [14], and this provides useful background and 
references for this section.
The current VPF is based on a series of opinion surveys reported by 
Beattie et al. [11] and Carthy et al. [12]. Survey respondents were asked 
about their willingness to pay for small reductions in the number of deaths 
or injuries from road accidents. From these responses, a value of £1 
million per prevented fatality was reported (1997 £s), and this value was 
subsequently adopted by the DfT, and is updated annually by indexing to 
GDP per head. This VPF is recommended for use in cost–benefit analyses 
forming part of the appraisal process for new road schemes that are funded 
by the DfT. The VPF is also used widely by local authorities for road safety 
[14].
The probability of a road fatality is higher than the risk of death in many 
other contexts (in the rail or nuclear industries, for example) and it was 
felt by the authors of the VPF research that survey respondents would 
comprehend a reduction in these ‘large’ risks more easily [11]. On the 
face of it, there appears indeed to be a much higher public acceptance of 
road fatalities than for other risks – it is hard to imagine an industrial or 
commercial setting in which 1900 deaths per year would be acceptable 
without protest (yet this is the mean of yearly road deaths that occurred 
from 2009 to 2013 [15]). A factor behind the de facto acceptance of this 
large annual incidence of fatalities may be the perception that the individual 
bears responsibility in a road accident, whereas for other forms of transport 
‘someone else’ is responsible and has a duty to afford people greater 
protection. 
Given the development of the DfT VPF figure in the context of the 
relatively high-risk area of road safety, it is an open question how far the 
value is appropriate for use in other contexts. Nevertheless, the DfT VPF is 
used widely across the UK, not only for transport, but in many other areas 
also. 
Within the purview of the DfT, the VPF is used by the Rail Standards and 
Safety Board (RSSB). Following privatisation and a series of rail accidents in 
the late 1990s/early 2000s, the RSSB sponsored a number of studies about 
people’s attitude to rail safety. One outcome of that programme was to 
remove a disproportion factor of three that had been applied to accidents 
involving multiple fatalities (see Section 5). The RSSB now values preventing 
a fatality on the railways with the DfT VPF, irrespective of the number of 
passengers at risk, with non-fatal injury prevention valued as a fraction of 
the VPF [14]. 
While regulators of the other major forms of transport, air and sea, 
do not recommend using the VPF in their safety assessments, six further 
government departments or agencies make use of the DfT VPF directly, 
according to the Deloitte review [14]. The Food Standards Agency uses 
the VPF to assess interventions to reduce food-borne illness, while the 
Department of Communities and Local Government uses the VPF for 
fire safety, flood prevention and domestic hot water safety schemes. The 
Home Office values the life of a homicide victim at the VPF and the HSE 
uses the VPF to value fatalities in workplace accidents. The latter include 
cancer-induced deaths, but here the value of the DfT VPF is doubled before 
application. Both the Environment Agency and the Health Protection 
Agency adopt the VPF. Meanwhile the Department of Health uses the DfT 
VPF in its derivation of the value of a quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) [9,15].
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), which devolved from the HSE in 
2011, uses the VPF as its yardstick for valuing human life [17], and follows 
the HSE which, in appendix 3, paragraph 13 of its document ‘Reducing risk, 
protecting people’ [1], states:
“Currently, HSE takes the view that it is only in the case where death is 
caused by cancer that people are prepared to pay a premium for the benefit 
of preventing a fatality and has accordingly adopted a VPF twice that of the 
roads benchmark figure.”
It may be observed, in passing, that it is not logical to double the VPF 
for a radiation cancer, which will deprive the victim of less than half the 
life expectancy lost through an immediately fatal road accident [18]. In any 
case, if the ‘roads benchmark’ VPF is arbitrary, as will be shown in Section 3, 
doubling its value will produce a similarly arbitrary figure. 
In fact, the ONR suggests that the factor of two will not normally be 
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important (paragraph 6.16 of [17]), thus appearing to downgrade the 
importance of a cost–benefit analysis using the VPF. This is curious, given 
the organisation’s expressed faith in the DfT VPF.
It is still, of course, incumbent on nuclear licensees to demonstrate that 
their residual risks are ALARP, meaning that further spending on safety has 
to be grossly disproportionate to the benefit it would generate. A licensee 
might have expected to apply the ONR-approved VPF to translate into 
pounds the benefit of any safety improvement deemed excessive by the 
licensee, since only in this way can an unambiguous comparison be made 
between benefit and cost. By the same token, the licensee might have 
expected the result of such a comparison to be accepted by the regulator. 
Reducing the importance assigned to this numerical comparison shifts the 
emphasis onto the subjective judgement of the ONR inspector and opens 
the door to regulatory inconsistency. The knock-on effect will be increased 
uncertainty in the costs faced by the licensee. 
3. Flaws in the UK VPF
The UK VPF is based on face-to-face interviews with 167 people, as 
described in a paper by Carthy et al. [12]. In an attempt to avoid the 
difficulty of asking people directly to put a value on preventing a fatality, 
the investigators devised a two-part process to elucidate people’s attitude to 
injuries and death, the two-injury chained method.
The theory of the two-injury chained method is summarised in the 
Appendix, including the concept of the ‘value of a prevented injury’ (VPI), 
which will morph into the VPF when the injury is fatal. But how does the 
theory fare in practice? Some indication of troubles ahead may be gleaned 
from the very wide range of values deduced for the average value of the 
VPF. Depending on the method used to filter and combine the results, 
the survey’s authors found this to lie between £700,000 and £33 million 
(1997 £s; see Tables 2–7 in reference 12), with the lower limit reduced to 
£120,000 after the authors allowed themselves the freedom to choose 
the median instead of the mean. Despite this spread of two orders of 
magnitude, the authors were confident to recommend a value of £1 million 
(1997 £s) to their sponsor. Moreover, a report for the DfT in 2011, co-
authored by some of the original investigators, concluded that there was no 
need to re-evaluate this recommendation [19].
But a comprehensive re-analysis of the methods and data used in the 
Carthy et al. paper was presented in 2015 by Thomas and Vaughan [13], 
who concluded that “there is no evidential base for the VPF that has been 
used for many years in the UK and is still in standard use today.” This 
conclusion was dictated by the discovery that the original work contained 
several important shortcomings. Most strikingly, it was found that the 
two-injury chained method that lies at the heart of the Carthy et al. study 
contained inherent flaws.
Thomas and Vaughan were able to compare different estimates of the 
same individual’s VPI for injury X using two methods put forward by Carthy 
et al. [12], which they applied to Carthy’s own data. The first estimate 
could be calculated after the individual had stipulated two payments he 
considered fair for the injury: the maximum acceptable price (MAP, £) he 
would pay to avert the injury and the minimum acceptable compensation 
(MAC, £) he would be willing to receive to make up for enduring the injury. 
The second estimate could be computed using the two-injury chained 
method to link injury X to a lesser injury, W. 
For the chained method to be valid, the two estimates would need to 
be at least approximately equal, but in fact the estimate coming from the 
chained method was a factor of 3–8 higher on average than the direct 
estimate. Moreover, there was a scatter of many orders of magnitude 
between individuals’ estimates under each method, and the estimates 
emerging from the two methods were found to be barely linearly 
correlated. See Figure 1, where the large scatter between points has 
dictated logarithmic scales so as to encompass all the results on one sheet 
of paper. The figure suggests that not only do individuals disagree strongly 
with the other members of the cohort, they tend to disagree strongly with 
themselves! Thomas and Vaughan concluded that the chained method was 
fundamentally flawed and should not be used.
In responding to these criticisms, Chilton et al. [20] said that they had 
themselves observed this inconsistency in their earlier paper [12]. They 
had noted the large discrepancy between their VPF estimates based 
on ‘direct’ calculation, £2–3 million, as listed in their Table 2, and their 
‘chained’ estimates, £14–33 million, as given in their Table 6 (all 1997 £s). 
Chilton et al. suggested this disparity was due to a tendency for individuals 
facing a specified severe injury to require nearly equal, low probabilities 
of failure from different treatments, even when one would give a much 
quicker and better recovery if successful. Since a difference between 
failure probabilities occurs in the denominator in the two-injury chained 
method, small variations can lead to large differences in the VPI and hence 
VPF. The authors’ admission (“This is undoubtedly a problem for the use 
of the chained approach”) is tantamount to conceding that the method 
underlying the UK VPF is unstable with regard to its input data. Thomas and 
Vaughan’s conclusion that the results of the original study cannot be relied 
upon is thus strengthened rather than diminished.
The subjective nature of the Carthy et al. [12] conclusions starts to 
become clear in the statement contained in Chilton et al. [20]: “If we had 
to judge, we would think it rather less plausible that this [£62,258] is the 
appropriate money equivalent for an injury that is completely healed with 
no further adverse effects after 18 months,” preferring a figure of £8959 
(equivalent to about six months’ mean gross income in 1997). Any doubts 
Figure 1: VPI for injury X, found for each individual by direct 
calculation and via the two-injury chained method (based on 
Figure 2 of [13]).
The very great scatter between points dictates the use of a 
log-log scale for display purposes. The straight line shown 
would have been followed if the two estimates had been 
equal: y = x. The best linear fit, y = 8.24x, reveals that the two 
estimates differ by an order of magnitude and have a very 
low linear correlation: R22 = 0.072. Only 7.2 per cent of the 
variation in the second estimate is explicable in terms of the 
variation in the first.
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about the dependence of the final figure on the authors’ judgement are 
removed by the last sentence of [20], where the “blending of evidence with 
judgement” to help consolidate the VPF is cited as the first contribution 
of the Carthy study. It is worth remembering at this point that stated 
preference surveys are normally undertaken to find an answer based on the 
preferences of the respondents, not the preferences of the authors.
Thomas and Vaughan [13] went on to discuss a further inconsistency 
in the VPF results, which failed Carthy et al.’s own test to compare the 
two-part and three-part chained method. Thomas and Vaughan were able 
to reproduce this inconsistency by processing a random dataset through 
a simulation of the chained method that included a randomly chosen 
multiplier to represent the ratio of the three-part and two-part chained 
estimates. Chilton et al. [20] did not respond to this evidence that their 
results were no better than random. 
Thomas and Vaughan [13] pointed out, in addition, that the wealth of 
the respondents deduced from the survey data was unreasonably small – 
below 10 per cent of the average adult wealth at the time of the survey. 
Chilton et al. [20] argued that wealth could not be inferred from the utility 
functions they used in their study for technical reasons. This argument 
was resisted by Thomas and Vaughan [21] on the grounds of consistency, 
whereupon two of the Carthy authors suggested, in a ‘Final response’ [22], 
that auxiliary utility functions could be used to cover low wealths. Thomas 
and Vaughan [23] were able to show, however, that this new suggestion 
would fail: it was a mathematical impossibility in two out of the three cases 
and economically unsound for the third. Even if the questionable economic 
validity were put aside for the sake of argument, it was still possible to 
calculate the implied average wealth. This remained the same as previously 
found – either £5252 or £1730 (1997 £s). Such low values, acknowledged 
by Jones-Lee and Loomes [22] to be “absurdly low”, would have been 
unrepresentative of the national population – the average UK adult wealth 
stood at £78,300 at the time of the survey in 1997 [24].
The discussion then moved on to the validity, or otherwise, of censoring 
data by using a ‘trimmed mean’ rather than the sample mean as the 
estimator of the VPF. Carthy et al. [12] removed two outliers with apparently 
high VPFs from the sample before taking the mean (now unilaterally 
trimmed) of the remaining sample as their best estimate, finding a VPF of 
£0.9 million to £1.6 million (1997 £s), depending on the utility model used. 
But Thomas and Vaughan [13] used a model simulation to show that there 
was no basis to reject even the highest outlier, so that the trimming process 
biased the results illegitimately low. Restoring the arbitrarily censored values 
produced a sample mean of £3.3 million with a 90 per cent confidence 
interval of £61,000 to £6.6 million (all 1997 £s), although Thomas and 
Vaughan commented that the serious flaws affecting the basic method 
meant that the figures were of academic interest only.
Thomas and Vaughan [21] concluded they could find no reason for 
changing their earlier conclusions that the VPF currently in widespread 
use “has been shown to be based on a study that does not stand up to 
scrutiny.”
4. Caveat investigator re-investigated
Prior to the Carthy et al. [12] surveys discussed above, essentially the 
same group of investigators (Beattie et al. [11]) published the results of 
two earlier surveys aimed at determining people’s willingness to pay to 
prevent a road fatality. The first survey involved focus groups and one-to-
one interviews with 83 people who were asked what they would pay for 
a car safety feature that would reduce their risk of injury or death in five 
different scenarios. The results showed that people were willing to pay 
£98 on average to reduce the risk of death by one in 100,000 and £139 
for a reduction in risk that was three times greater. The authors expected 
people’s responses to be linear in risk-reduction, at least roughly, but in fact 
respondents seemed to be willing to pay only 1.4 times more for a three-
fold reduction in risk. On the basis of this result, the methodology of this 
survey was rejected and a further survey commissioned.
The second survey asked how much respondents were willing to pay to 
reduce the number of road deaths in “the area in which they lived”, taken 
to contain one million people. A total of 52 individuals were interviewed. 
The questions involved reducing the number of deaths by five or 15 per 
year over a period of either one or five years. After providing their answers, 
the respondents were prompted to consider whether their valuations 
were linear with regard to the number of lives saved and were given the 
opportunity to revise their answers [11]; however, once again, the results 
suggested that in order to prevent multiple deaths, people were willing to 
pay only 1.3 times more to prevent three deaths as they were to prevent 
one.
The results of both these studies were rejected by the authors and 
their sponsors due to their perceived “serious doubt on the reliability 
and validity” of the study methods [11]. They went so far as to give their 
published paper the label ‘Caveat investigator’ – Let the investigator 
beware.
But were the authors correct to reject the opinions of the 135 survey 
respondents? Thomas and Vaughan [25] argued that they were not, and 
demonstrated that the survey responses could be accounted for by the 
same reasoning that explains the prevalence of offers such as ‘Buy one, get 
one free’ and ‘3 for the price of 2’ in supermarkets. Thomas and Chrystal 
[26] had introduced the theory of relative utility pricing (RUP), using utility 
functions to describe how consumers value a multi-pack of a commodity 
relative to a smaller pack. The theory was able to explain the pricing of 
different ‘packs’ of milk, eggs and USB memory sticks, for example [27].
The RUP model applies to any commodity that is offered simultaneously 
in different pack sizes, and Thomas and Vaughan [25] were able to argue 
that the safety benefits offered to participants in the Beattie et al. survey 
could be considered as commodities. A necessary feature in RUP theory 
is that a person should assign a positive utility to a positive benefit, with a 
larger benefit attracting a higher utility. This requirement on discrimination 
eliminated approximately 45 per cent of the Beattie et al. samples 
from further analysis, leaving 74 respondents in total who were able to 
discriminate between the different safety measures or ‘packs’. Thomas and 
Vaughan calculated the mean ratio of the MAPs that these respondents 
were willing to pay for the two safety packs and found similar values for 
the two surveys: 1.98 for the first and 1.93 for the second. Recalling that 
the second safety pack provided three times the benefit of the first in both 
the surveys, the MAP ratio of 2.0 deduced from RUP theory lay comfortably 
within the 90 per cent confidence intervals of the observed means.
Having shown that the respondents' valuations could be explained 
by the RUP model, Thomas and Vaughan then calculated the VPF 
implied by their results [25]. After removing the respondents who were 
unable to distinguish between the safety packs, a VPF in the range £8.7 
million<VPF1<£11.9 million was found based on the first pack, and a VPF 
of £4.6million<VPF2<£5.9 million (all 1997 £s) was found from the second 
pack, which produced three times the benefit of the first. They noted that 
when the second pack is a much higher multiple of the first in terms of risks 
reduced or premature deaths averted, the RUP model predicts that VPF2 will 
converge towards VPF1. Thus they concluded that VPF1 has “more general 
applicability”.
The point is that, if one puts one’s faith in stated preference valuations, 
then the Carthy et al. surveys [12] have to be rejected because of the major 
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flaws exposed and the Beattie et al. surveys [11] are the ones to be believed. 
But the spending on avoiding a premature death, as derived from the 
Beattie et al. surveys (between £8.7 million and £11.9 million), will need to 
be an order of magnitude larger than that adopted by the investigation’s 
sponsors (£1 million, all 1997 £s). Upgrading these figures to accommodate 
the increase in GDP per head since the Beattie study was carried out, this 
suggests that the current VPF should lie between £16 million and £22 
million (2016 £s).
5. Multiple fatalities: RSSB’s reliance on a biased study
Do people put a premium on preventing multiple fatalities in a single 
accident? Prior to 2003, the rail industry had mandated the use of two 
different VPFs when making a rail safety case: one for single-fatality 
accidents and a second, larger VPF for multi-fatality accidents [28]. 
Following its establishment in 2003, the RSSB adopted the DfT’s VPF for 
all accident scenarios. This had the practical effect of reducing by a factor 
of three the amount that rail operators were obliged to spend to avert a 
fatality in an accident expected to cause many deaths if it happened.
The RSSB commissioned research in 2005 to investigate whether people 
would in fact prioritise safety spending based on the type of accident, 
in particular multi-fatality accidents, those involving children and fatal 
occurrences resulting from deliberate acts: trespass and suicide. The results 
were published in an RSSB technical report [29] and subsequently in Covey 
et al. [30]. The study, with a number of authors common to both of the 
VPF studies discussed above, concluded that the prevention of a death in 
a multi-fatality accident was not valued any higher than the prevention 
of an isolated death. On this basis, the RSSB continued and continues to 
recommend a single VPF when assessing all accident scenarios.
Thomas [31] reviewed the methodology reported in [30], which had been 
used in a number of influential studies on the VPF carried out in the UK for 
different government departments and agencies, including the HSE and 
the DfT, as well as in the Covey et al. report for the RSSB [29]. These studies 
all relied upon interpreting the results of one or more stated preference 
surveys, where respondents were questioned indirectly about their 
willingness to pay to avoid death in two scenarios, A and B. The respondent 
is asked to specify how many deaths in scenario A he considers to be as 
undesirable as a possibly different number of deaths in scenario B. Then, 
since the individual regards the two outcomes as equally bad, it is assumed 
that he would be prepared to authorise equal expenditure to avert each set 
of deaths. The ratio, RABi, of his expenditure per death averted in scenario A 
to his corresponding figure in scenario B will then follow the inverse ratio of 
the numbers of deaths he considered equivalently bad:
RABi = VAi / VBi = NBi / NAi
where V stands for value and N for number.
The question is then how to combine these ratios from all respondents 
into a single measure for the acceptable ratio of the spend against a death 
in scenario A compared with the expenditure against a fatality in scenario 
B. The sample mean of RABi, known to be an unbiased estimator, is easy 
to calculate and is the only statistic recommended for consolidating views 
measured by opinion surveys [32]; however, Covey et al. chose to employ a 
non-standard and more complicated statistic, the Valuation Index. 
The Valuation Index possesses the property of reciprocality, in the sense 
that the index of the reciprocal is equal to the reciprocal of the index. This 
reciprocality comes at a price, however: the Valuation Index fails the test 
of “structural view independence”, the principle that there should be no 
inbuilt bias in a consolidation algorithm that would render the views of 
some people less important than the views of others [32].
Far from giving equal weight to each respondent’s view, the Valuation 
Index is biased against anyone wanting more spent per death averted in a 
multi-fatality accident than in a single-fatality accident. The bias becomes 
more marked the more averse the person is to multi-fatality accidents (see 
Figure 2).
The built-in bias towards low valuations makes the Valuation Index 
particularly unsuitable for investigating whether or not society wants more 
to be spent to prevent deaths in a multiple-fatality rail accident. To the 
extent that they rely on such a study for support, any safety case, regulation 
or recommendation citing or based on the results generated using the 
Valuation Index has to be regarded as unsafe. 
6. The J-value
As discussed above, the UK VPF has been shown to lack credibility in 
the last two years; however, there remains a continuing need for nuclear 
licensees to demonstrate ALARP if they are to comply with UK law. In fact, 
ALARP arguments may now be made objectively and rigorously using the 
Judgement- or J-value technique. Developed over the last decade, the 
J-value is a revealed preference method that is able to place an objective 
value on the increase in life expectancy that the safety measure brings 
about, summed over all its beneficiaries. 
The philosophical and mathematical basis for the J-value has been laid 
out in this journal before [33], and a full set of papers is available at www.
jvalue.org.uk. Rather than being reliant on the subjective opinions of a small 
group of people, the J-value is instead grounded in objective actuarial and 
economic statistics that characterise the lives and behaviours of millions 
of citizens. The parameter is thus suitable for assessing health and safety 
measures across all industries, from oil and gas, chemical and nuclear, 
through transport to the National Health Service in the UK. Moreover, unlike 
other approaches, the J-value allows immediate fatalities and loss of life 
in the longer term (e.g. after exposure, either of workers or of the general 
public, to a carcinogen such as nuclear radiation) to be differentiated but 
measured on the same scale.
The principal author recommending continued reliance on the UK VPF 
[19] composed a negative review [34] in 2009 of the J-value literature for 
the Nuclear Division of the HSE, now ONR. Despite being prepared for 
what is now ONR and stating that its author had worked as a “physicist/
Figure 2: Some people’s opinions count for less: relative 
weightings of respondents’ views when the Valuation Index is 
used (based on Figure 1 of [31]). 
Assign single-fatality accidents to scenario A and multiple-
fatality accidents to scenario B.
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engineer” in the nuclear industry, the report made no attempt to analyse 
the J-value papers dealing with nuclear risks (roughly half the literature 
available at that time). When the report was eventually made public, its 
objections were fully answered by Lind [35] and Thomas and Jones [36]. 
A ‘final comment’ was supplied by the author two and a half years later 
[37] but he made no attempt at a reasoned rebuttal of the points made 
in [35] and [36], seemingly content merely to restate his faith in the stated 
preference methods discussed above.
The J-value method has recently been validated against pan-national data 
[38], and its objective nature means that the method can offer consistency 
and certainty in regulation, particularly for cases where an ALARP argument 
needs to be made.
7. Conclusions
The VPF is used widely in the UK by government departments and agencies 
in the assessment of safety schemes to protect the public. Based on stated 
preference research carried out in the late 1990s for the now Department 
for Transport, it is updated annually in line with GDP per head and has a 
current value of £1.83 million (2016 £s).
But recent investigations have revealed severe methodological problems 
with the research upon which this VPF is based. The analysis of the stated 
preferences of the 167 people in the survey that underpins the VPF figure 
has been shown to be seriously flawed. By contrast, a new understanding 
of retail price offers – particularly ‘3 for the price of 2’ – explains the findings 
of the previous ‘Caveat investigator’ study that was rejected by its authors 
and sponsors but was actually valid as a stated-preference survey. If stated 
preferences are to be believed, the UK public wants a VPF that is 10 times 
higher than the current value, at between £16 million and £22 million 
(2016 £s).
The clear findings on the lack of evidence for the UK VPF mean it is 
questionable whether any safety case presented from now on that relies 
in any way upon the UK VPF, whether on the roads, the railways or in the 
nuclear industry, could stand up to test in court.
Meanwhile, a survey cited as support for a three-fold reduction in safety 
spending on UK railways against big train accidents has been found to be 
biased against all those who wanted more spent on preventing big train 
accidents. To the extent that they are reliant on such a study for support, it 
is open to doubt whether any safety case, regulation or recommendation 
citing or based on results generated using the Valuation Index could resist 
legal challenge.
At a more fundamental level, the value of a prevented fatality – a 
uniform valuation for every possible premature death – is a very blunt 
instrument with which to assess the impact of safety measures. In particular, 
this approach cannot accommodate properly a delayed death that may 
occur many years after an accident, such as death from a radiation-induced 
cancer. A method of valuing human safety is required in the nuclear industry 
that treats everyone equally and fairly and is based on solid evidence – the 
VPF is not that method.
 
Appendix
The two-injury chained method [12] is based on the application of 
utility functions, economic constructs that are designed to model 
the benefit or satisfaction that an individual feels he is getting from 
his wealth. It boils down to the following. The respondent is asked 
to imagine he has been injured in a road accident and is offered 
two hospital operations, A or B, each of which will leave him with 
a serious, ‘type 2’ injury should it fail. Operation A will still leave the 
patient with a less serious, ‘type 1’ injury even if it succeeds. But, 
provided it is successful, operation B will return the patient to full 
health almost immediately. Other things being equal, operation B 
looks to be the one to choose. 
But what happens if the probabilities of success are different for the 
two surgical procedures? The Carthy authors thought that Operation 
B’s potentially better outcome should cause the patient to accept 
that it could fail more often. They then theorised that information 
on acceptable failure probabilities, elicited via a ‘standard gamble’ 
procedure, should determine the ratio, m2i /m1i, of individual i’s value of 
a prevented injury (VPI) of type 2, m2i, to his VPI for a type 1 injury, m1i. 
Further theory expounded by Carthy et al. [12] suggests that an 
individual’s VPI for a type 1 injury can be calculated after drawing 
out from the respondent both the maximum acceptable price (MAP, 
£) he would pay to avert the injury and the minimum acceptable 
compensation (MAC, £) he would be willing to receive to make up for 
enduring the injury. Multiplying the individual’s VPI for a type 1 injury 
by the VPI ratio, m2i /m1i, found from the standard gamble model, then 
gives his VPI, m2i, for a type 2 injury. 
If the type 2 injury is taken to be fatal, then the type 2 VPI will be 
equal to the individual’s personal VPF, mDi. If the sample has been 
chosen to cover the full spectrum of wealths in the UK, averaging over 
all the people in the sample will then yield the VPF for the UK as a 
whole, mD.
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Abbreviations
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
DfT Department for Transport
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HSE Health and Safety Executive
J-value Judgement-value
MAC minimum acceptable compensation
MAP maximum acceptable price
NICE National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation
QALY quality-adjusted life year
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board
RUP relative utility pricing
VPF value of a prevented fatality
VPI value of a prevented injury 
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